During
Russia’s transition to capitalism many things went wrong, from politics to
economic decisions. People are always reluctant to change and the “Status Quo”
will always fight hard to persist, for a simple reason: whoever is in a
dominant or privileged position does not want to give up his/her advantages.
The
communist strive to stay in power over any adversity or adversary, either
smashing opposition or promoting corruption. During perestroika, who did not oppose to changes, drove to get the most
out the reforms to themselves; as regions, bureaucrats, and industrial firms’
directors (Red directors) actually did.
Regions
took advantage of the Russian government weakness. In order to improve their
position of power, regions let the Federal office in a precarious situation;
poor tax recovery, less control over regions and unable to comply with its
budgetary and fiscal obligations. While bureaucrats, politicians and “Red
Directors” managed to grab as much wealth as they could.
The
privatization process was plagued of inconsistencies, improvisation, corruption
and even illegality. Managers of companies being privatized end up with more
power and wealth than predicted. 16,500 firms were given away, leaving Russian
government in the same position as before. A plan to privatize Russia’s most
valuable, public and strategic, assets was orchestrated by bankers, benefiting
from the “deal”, and politicians in “Pledge Auctions”; where the first ones, end
up acquiring those assets for a fraction of their value, in the middle of questionable
transactions.
Privatization
is a serious matter, and may be the best option to boost an economy, or even
save a country with economic and social problems:
“Governments take privatization stance
to reduce its burden in terms of underutilization of resources, over and
redundant employment, fiscal burden, financial crises, heavy losses and
subsidies in order to improve and strengthen competition, public finances, funding
to infrastructure, and quality and quantity of services in terms of
management.”1
But
in this case did not go in the right way. Even though the motives to enact the
“Pledge Auctions” may be durable at some extend, the actual output is not
consistent with the reality, needs, and best interest of the Russian nation. If
the auctions have gone right and fully transparent, the Russian government
would have received more than enough money to be used to fix the enormous problems
and challenges the nation was facing, without resigning to its most valuable
assets at the end; or if does, would end up with a lot more cash than what actually
received.
From
my point of view, this full episode of privatization, disguised as loan, starred
by Oneksimbank, Menatep, Inkombank, Imperial, Stolinchny and Russian’s
politicians, is more a conspiracy to steal Russian wealth than a movement to
save the economy.
Monetary
and fiscal policies did not follow the logic of the process, while adjusting an
economy, it is imperative to maintain fiscal discipline and a tight monetary
approach in order to control inflation and other economical distortions that
may surge. In the other hand, pop up issues are easier to manage from austerity
than from monetary liberalism.
The
lack of knowledge, poor management and corruption is more than obvious in the
full transition of Russia from communism to capitalism, spoiling the full
process from the very beginning.
A
considerable amount of trade was being conducted between EU and Russia, during
the period of 1992 to 1999 (See chart below); a natural path to follow, would be
deep into that already established relationship to integrate to Europe, while
also open to some other neighbors like China, Japan and to U.S. as well. Hesitation
is not a good adviser when making radical revolutions, and hidden agendas do
not help either.
Exports and Imports by Partner,
1993-99
|
||||||||
(millions of U.S.
dollars)
|
||||||||
1992
|
1993
|
1994
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
|
Exports
|
||||||||
U.S.
|
694
|
1,998
|
3,748
|
5,092
|
4,584
|
4,951
|
4,808
|
6,433
|
EU
|
20,226
|
19,672
|
22,412
|
26,054
|
26,977
|
28,000
|
22,826
|
24,022
|
CIS
|
13,574
|
14,366
|
15,310
|
16,584
|
13,369
|
10,690
|
||
Other
|
18,822
|
22,377
|
23,344
|
32,083
|
34,567
|
34,619
|
28,727
|
31,938
|
Imports
|
||||||||
U.S.
|
2,885
|
2,304
|
2,071
|
2,651
|
2,231
|
4,061
|
3,992
|
2,387
|
EU
|
15,953
|
11,198
|
15,383
|
18,005
|
15,669
|
19,578
|
15,427
|
11,102
|
CIS
|
10,309
|
13,450
|
13,935
|
14,081
|
11,015
|
8,339
|
||
Other
|
15,895
|
13,249
|
10,837
|
12,293
|
11,483
|
14,409
|
12,042
|
8,484
|
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (Washington, D.C.:
IMF, 1997-2000).
|
||||||||
The
prelude of problems starts with Boris Yeltsin, who decided to follow a personal
political agenda before the nation’s best interest; even, in the middle of a
huge democratization process, to be implemented, in a country with no
democratic experience at all. Russia came from a 500 years old Tsarist regime,
to a communist regime, both autocratic systems.
Complex
democratization processes, like the Russian one, are supposed to be implemented
gradually, with high degree of caution and transparency. The first aspect to
attack may be the economic one, along with a deep legal reform to establish a
framework to deal with present and future changes. In a government with fiscal
and budgetary immediate needs, a privatization strategy is a durable option,
but assuring that it will bring enough cash to resolve the above mentioned
causes. It is also valid to consider in soliciting loans from international institutions,
while well financed and under the right conditions. Price liberalization may
follow with responsible fiscal and monetary management, hand to hand with a
macroeconomic tune up. The political aspect may be the last to touch, due to
its sensitivity and the need of a strong political capital to succeed.
It
is hard to blame one or two people, or a project, or policy in particular, so many
private agendas were prioritized before the national interest. Many subjects
were ready to take advantage of the situation while lack of experience was
reigning during the process.
After
the failure, Russia faced two options, either continue to liberalization and
democratization of its system or going backwards, as seems to be doing under
the Medvedev-Putin “Tamdem”.2
Vladimir
Putin is focused in reversing all advances made by Russia in regards of liberalization
and democracy. During his mandate a low respect for the rule of law, human
rights or press independence has been appreciated. Putin is seen as going in
and out from Kremlin assisted by his protégé Dmitriy Medvedev. Putin ruled from
2000 to 2008 to put Medvedev in power from 2008 to 2012; just on time, to enact
a reform to extend presidential periods to 6 years, instead of the former 4
years, and the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) to 5 years. After these
reforms, Putin has come back, and may last for at least 12 years more in power,
if the providence allows it.
Russia’s
economy began to recover from the 1999 collapse supported mainly by oil and gas
exports; and is still growing. Putin’s legitimization has its roots in the
income generated from oil exported products and oil price increases, along with
the opportunity, to show a steady economy grow, have social expenditure, and
suppress social unrest.3 But the dependency on oil and petroleum
products is increasing to very high levels; more than 50% of Russia’s exports,
in the latest years, are coming from oil and petroleum products (See chart below).
Oil - Petroleum Products
Revenues, and Exports Share
|
|||
Year
|
Oil Revenue
|
Petrol. Prod. Rev.
|
Share for Oil and
|
U$ Billions
|
U$ Billions
|
Petrol. Prod. Exports
|
|
2000
|
$
25.30
|
$ 10.90
|
34.3%
|
2001
|
$
25.00
|
$ 9.30
|
33.5%
|
2002
|
$
29.10
|
$ 11.20
|
37.5%
|
2003
|
$
39.70
|
$ 14.00
|
39.4%
|
2004
|
$
59.00
|
$ 19.20
|
42.6%
|
2005
|
$
83.40
|
$ 33.80
|
48.0%
|
2006
|
$
102.30
|
$ 46.60
|
48.3%
|
2007
|
$
114.20
|
$ 51.40
|
48.8%
|
2008
|
$
151.70
|
$ 78.30
|
51.0%
|
2009
|
$
93.50
|
$ 46.80
|
48.9%
|
2010
|
$
129.00
|
$ 69.40
|
51.4%
|
2011
|
$
171.70
|
$ 91.30
|
53.1%
|
Source: Wojciech Konończuk (April, 2012). Russia’s Best Ally: “The situation of the Russian oil sector and
forecast for its future”: p.10-11. Available
online at http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_39_en.pdf
In the other hand, problems associated with the oil exploitation, and the fall
of production of the most important reservoirs across the nation, may be a sign
that new strategic approach should be implemented, if the sustainability of the
Russian economy is the goal. Even today, Russia is still impacted for a
deficient, “unreformed healthcare system and unhealthy lifestyles, low domestic
and foreign investment, corruption, high crime rates, capital flight, and
unemployment.”2
Russia
is still a nuclear super power and a strategic ally to U.S. in controlling the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and for that reason,
Washington has helped with almost $19 billion from FY 1992 through FY 2010 to
promote democracy and freedom for the Russians; but Russia’s conflict with
Georgia in 2008 has jeopardized the cooperation.
After
2012, the cooperation in the control of WMDs has changed, and a new, and more
limited agreement in this matter, has replaced the old one in June 2013. 2
If
Russia should be able to continue the path to democratization, has a lot to
offer to its nationals and to the world at large; with a great scope in natural
resources and positioned as the second larger exporter of oil, just after Saudi
Arabia, Russia may be considered a complementary economy for countries like
United States in areas like “food and food processing, oil and gas extraction
technology, computers, communications, transportation, and investment capital.”2
An open and democratic Russia will boost its economy when interacting to the
world based on its competitive advantages and the possibility to find the
capital needed to execute ambitious programs, and projects, that would result in
prosperity, and more stable lifestyle to its nationals.
1- International Journal of Contemporary Business Studies, (October, 2011). Vol: 2, No: 10. ISSN 2156-7506
2- Jim Nichol, (September 13, 2013). Russian
Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interest. Congressional
Research Service.
Available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.com
3- Wojciech Konończuk (April, 2012). Russia’s Best Ally: “The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future”.
Available online at http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_39_en.pdf
3- Wojciech Konończuk (April, 2012). Russia’s Best Ally: “The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future”.
Available online at http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_39_en.pdf
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